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Dialogues, East and West
CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN PAUL TILLICH AND
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PART THREE
Participants: Paul Tillich
Hisamatsu Shin’ichi
(Mrs.) Hannah Tillich
Interpreters: Richard DeMartino
Fujiyoshi Jikai
De Martino: In the beginning of this new book of his, Zen and the Fine Arts? 
published in Japan just a few weeks ago, Dr. Hisamatsu contrasts the 
aesthetic creations of Zen with those of other Buddhist sects. The latter are 
generally found to be much more formal and cultish, making use almost 
exclusively of traditional Buddhist materials. The material of Zen art, on the 
other hand, can be anything, including what ordinarily would be considered 
most insignificant—or, indeed, even profane.
Mrs. Tillich (to Dr. Tillich): That is very similar to your idea of religious art.
* For Parts One and Two, see The Eastern Buddhist, Nev Series, Vol. IV, No. 2, October 
1971, pp- 89-108, and Vol. V, No. 2, October 1972, pp. 107-128. (IZ)
1 Hisamatsu Shin’ichi, Zwr to Bijntsn, Bokubisha, Kyoto, Japan, 1958. It has since been 
published in an English translation: Shin’ichi Hisamatsu, Zen and the Fine Arts, Kodansha 
International, Ltd., Tokyo and Palo Alto, 1971. (Ed.}
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De Martino for Hitamatsu: These earthen 
vessels for example, were made in 
Korea, where they did not receive 
any especial attention. In Japan, how­
ever, they were singled out by the 
Zen laymen fashioning the ‘Way of 
Tea’ as uniquely appropriate to the 
precise religio-aesthetic sense therein 
being developed. In other words, 
judged according to the canons of 
beauty and “taste” of this indigenous 
Japanese Zen art, these unassuming 
utensils came to possess a hitherto 
undiscovered significance. Many of 
these Chinese Zen paintings, not too 
highly regarded in China, were like­
wise eventually to find their home in 
Japan—for instance, this “Dancing 
Pu-tai” by Liang-kai.
Tillich: What is the characteristic of 
Zen in such a painting?
“Dancing Pu-tai”
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DeMartino for Hisamatsu: The predominant Zen quality in this work is that 
of unattached—or “unconditioned”—freedom.
Tillich: Freedom from the natural form? or from what?
Fujiyoshi for Hisamatsu: Freedom from everything.
De Martino: It is, of course, not alone a “freedom from.” Rooted in the Self that 
is Not-of-Form—or, in your designation, “Being itself’—it enjoys the 
unlimited “freedom to” realize its Self-expression in any form.
Tillich: I can understand that.
DeMartino: Though I used your term, “Being itself,” actually it is not con­
fined to being—nor, for that matter, to nonbeing. In fact, the justification 
for characterizing it as “unconditioned” is exactly that it is free of the duality 
of “being-and-nonbeing.” This is the reason Zen does not speak of “Being 
itself,” which is still in some sort of conflict with “nonbeing.”
Tillich: Would freedom in this picture then mean becoming what one is 
essentially?
De Martino for Hisamatsu: This dancing figure depicts the consummate 
unfetteredness of what is called in Japanese, yuke-sammai—the “samadhi of 
absolutely untrammeled play.”
Fujiyoshi: Sacred play.
De Martino: Yes; spiritual play.
Tillich: “Spiritual play”—that is better than “freedom.”
DeMartino for Hisamatsu: For Dr. Hisamatsu they are synonymous.
Tillich: “Spiritual play,” an extremely clear concept, belongs to the romantic 
tradition. An immensely important element, it is, nonetheless, far from 
exhaustive. The concluding item in my own doctrine of freedom, Dr. 
Hisamatsu would probably not accept: the freedom to contradict one’s 
freedom.
DeMartino for Hisamatsu: Does that pertain to the doing of good and evil? 
Tillich: The doing of evil.
De Martino for Hisamatsu: Zen freedom manifests itself “beyond” the distinc­
tion of good and evil. Dr. Hisamatsu stressed that Zen is never legalistic. 
I told him that you weren’t either.
Tillich: No, I am not.
DeMartino: Breaking through duality per se> Zen breaks through the polarity 
as well of good and evil. With emancipation in Zen, there is no bondage 
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or “obstruction” of any kind; quite the contrary, there is unbounded and 
unobstructed “Self-regeneration.”
Tillicb: “Unobstructed” is also a good word.
DeMartino for Hiiamattu: The conclusive feature of this lack of constriction 
is that despite Zen’s being a “form”—or, I suppose I should say, “formless- 
form”—of Buddhism, it neither depends upon, is attached to, nor is shackled 
by “Buddha.”
Tillicb: That I would presuppose in all classical Buddhism.
DeMartino: Unfortunately, it does not apply to all of classical Buddhism. 
Tillicb: No?
DeMartino: It is a special mark of Zen.
Fujiyotbi: Onl y Zen!
De Martino for Hiiamattu: Zen's freedom, moreover, is free from—or unat­
tached to—“being un-attached.”
Tillicb: It can be attached?
DeMartino: No; it is “not attached” to its “being non-attached.” Put another 
way, the “unattachment” is itself “unattached.”
Tillicb: If free from non-attachment, does this allow for a volitional “at­
taching”?
Hiiamattu (in Japanese) : The freedom of Zen is free from attachment even 
to itself.
Fujiyotbi to Hitamatsu (in Japanese): You say, “not attached to non-attach- 
ment”; in that case, Dr. Tillich asks, “How about freely attaching?”
Hiiamattu (in Japanese): Attached to freedom? Being unattached is freedom. 
DeMartino for Hitamattu: It is the “unattachment” that is the “freedom.” 
Tillich: But you said more than that.
De Martino: Yes; this freedom is likewise “unattached” to the “freedom”— 
or to the “not being attached.”
Tillicb: Then you can continue endlessly—not being attached to not being 
attached to not being attached.
DeMartino: When the “nonattachment” is “pure,” it does not fall into the 
pattern of such an “infinite regress.” For since what is entailed is not a 
lateral or “horizontal” negation of one pole of the duality by the other, this 
is not a simple or “relative” negation of attachment. It is rather a negation 
of the very duality of “attachmcnt-and-unattachment.” Consequently, 
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it is a negation that is actually positive—a freedom that is free precisely 
of the duality of “freedom-and-unfreedom.” This, incidentally, would be 
a further indication of its “unconditional” quality.
Tillich: So it is what in German Romanticism is spoken of as “freedom from 
bondage to anything.”
DeMartino: Zen demands the overt “Self-substantiation” of this “freedom 
from bondage to anything.”
Tillich: That returns us to the problem of our previous discussion. In this 
painting it delineates itself in this way and not in twenty other ways.
DeMartino: Yes; in this instance it manifests itself in this form.
Tillich: This specific form. There must be an inner relationship, therefore, 
between this particular manifestation and ultimate reality—or the Self 
that is Formless.
De Martino: This form-expression as a formless-form “is” the Sclf-of-No-Form 
revealing Itself.
Tillich: In that usage, the copula “is” becomes ambiguous.
De Martino: Yes. In Dr. Hisamatsu’s formulation: “That which expresses is 
that which is expressed”—to which I have made a slight addition: “and that 
through which it is expressed.” Nevertheless, I would agree that as with the 
personal pronouns “his” in the first conversation and “my” last time, the 
verb “is” here can be misleading. This is why Zen teachers often eschew 
the use of words, preferring instead to raise a finger, to offer one a cup of tea, 
to bellow divers “unintelligible” sounds, or, frequendy, to have recourse 
to some sort of “bodily” contact.
Tillich: Looking at this picture, I see this face and these feet. It is a clearly 
defined image. There are such people in the world. The ultimate and this 
individual form, accordingly, have something to do with each other.
DeMartino to Hisamatsu (in Japanese): For Dr. Tillich, this is a “definite” form. 
There are people like this in the world. If this is a portrayal of the Self- 
Without-Form, then that ultimate “Formlessness” and this finite form must 
be related in some way.
Hisamatsu (in Japanese): While all of the seven characteristics2 of Zen an 
2 These seven characteristics are: asymmetry, simplicity, austere sublimity, natural­
ness, subtle profundity, nonattached freedom, and tranquility. See Znr md the Fine Arti, 
pp. 29ft". fXz/.J
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arc to be found in this work, the most pronounced is that of “unconditioned 
freedom.”
De Martino (in Japanese): The immediate concern of Dr. Tillich is the “rela­
tion” between this singular form and the Self that is Not-of-Form.
Hisamatsu (in Japanese): The relation is that the frceness of the Self-thar-is- 
of-No-Form is revealed in this form.
DeMartino (in Japanese): That is what I tried to say. What troubles Dr.
Tillich, however, is this: this “Dancing 
Pu-tai” by Liang-kai has an explicit 
form.
Hiramatsu (in Japanese): Yes.
DeMartino (in Japanese): This “Sitting 
Pu-tai” by Hakuin has its own distinct 
form.
Hisamatsu (in Japanese): Yes; it is a dif­
ferent form.
DeMartino (in Japanese): If, then, these 
diverse forms express the Selfless-Self, in 
Dr. Tillich’s view there has to be some 
connection between these forms and 
that Self.
Hisamatsu (in Japanese): In its Self-con- 
crctization the Self-Without-Self can 
assume innumerable forms.
DeMartino (in Japanese): Yes; but is 
there any interrelation “between” the 
various forms “and” the Self that is 
Formless? Dr. Tillich’s understanding 
seems to be that the Self-Without-Form 
is somehow separate from these numer­
ous forms.
Hisamatsu (in Japanese): No; to think it 
separate is not good.
“Sitting Pu-tai”
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DeMartino to Tillich: I am attempting to explain what I believe is your posi­
tion. You say this is a unique form; hence, it is in some relation to ultimate 
reality.
Tillich: Yes.
De Martino: This is another discrete form; thus, it too bears a relationship 
to the ultimate.
Tillich: Yes.
De Martino: So that involved are, as it were, three entities: this form, this 
other form, and ultimate reality.
Tillich: Yes.
De Martino: In your interpretation, consequently, these multiple forms are 
to be distinguished from the ultimate.
Tillich: Yes; such a distinction is to be made.
De Martino: If, however, this form is understood as being “apart from” that 
which is ultimate, it would not be what Zen is talking about.
Tillich: Then this form would stand absolutely for the ultimate, which would 
make any other form impossible.
DeMartino: To a Zen man, this form does not “stand for” but “ex-presses” 
ultimacy.
Tillich: Yes; it is one expression.
DeMartino: “One,” and yet not simply “one.” For this expresses the ultimate 
“entirely,” and that also expresses the ultimate “entirely.”
Tillich: If it is said of these two forms that they are expressions, then this is 
“one” expression and that is “another” expression.
Hisamatsu (in Japanese): It is because Dr. Tillich thinks analytically. From the 
Zen vantage point, when this one form is painted, this is “the whole”; and 
when that one form is painted, that is “the whole.”
De Martino for Hisamatsu: Dr. Hisamatsu feels that your approach is analytical. 
From the perspective of the Selfless-Self, this form circumscribes “all,” and 
that form likewise circumscribes “all.”
Tillich: Still, it does so in a particular manner.
De Martino for Hisamatsu: Taken that way, Dr. Hisamatsu submits, it would 
no longer be ultimate.
Tillich: Neither if taken the other way. Here we really come to a pivotal 
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theme—the role of the particular. In this book, Zen and the Fine Arts, there 
are over a hundred individual representations of ultimate reality.
De Martino: Merely to denominate them “individual representations” of 
ultimacy is to fail to recognize them as “formless-forms”—or as themselves 
“ultimate.”
Tillich: Is this the result of being under the power of may a!
De Martino: Dr. Hisamatsu referred to it as being “analytical.”
Tillich: Yes; but is the analytical untrue?
DeMartino: The risk is that with analysis alone, the Self that is “Not-of- 
Form”—and so “unanalyzable”—is missed.
Tillich: You spoke of the form “expressing the ultimate.” I, too, could say 
that of this flower.
De Martino: I do not maintain, however, that it is “just one particular ex­
pression” of ultimacy—which would imply that it is not itself ultimate. On 
the contrary, as ultimacy expressing itself, this flower is both particular 
and non-particular—or, therefore, what I would like to call a “non-particular 
particular.” In more traditional Zen terminology, “The flower is not a 
flower.”
Tillich: Instead of “particular,” let us say “different from.” This flower is 
different from this painting.
DeMartino: “Different” and yet “not different.” A Zen master gazing at 
a flower may remark: “I see the flower, and the flower sees me.”
Tillich: “The flower sees me.” That I can understand.
De Martino: In my own effort to deal wi th this “analytically,” I have suggested 
that the Zen man could simultaneously observe: “When I see the flower, 
I see my Self; the flower sees my Self; the flower sees the flower; the flower 
sees its Self; my Self sees its Self, its Self sees its Self.”3
3 See D.T. Suzuki, Erich Fromm and Richard DeMartino, Zen Buddhism and Psycho- 
analysis (New York: Harper and Bros.), i960, p. 170 (Ed.)
Tillich: You forget that with the word “my” you introduce particularity. 
De Martino: Yes; “my Self’ is particular and, concomitantly, “not-particular.” 
For, as Dr. Hisamatsu said during the last conversation, this “my”—like this 
Self—is Formless.
Tillich: Even so, you cannot eliminate the “my.”
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De Mart mo: Exactly. That is why at the start of the previous session Dr. 
Hisamatsu emphasized that Zen’s “Formlessness” must be the “Formless- 
Myself.” This was the central issue as well in a discussion I had with Pro­
fessor Buber (Martin, 1878-1965) earlier this year at Columbia University. 
In the Zen master’s proclamation, “I am thou,” the “I” does not cancel out 
the “thou.” I am I and thou art thou; nevertheless, I am thou and thou art 
I. This is in no sense a “reductionistic” non-duality—which is the reason I 
choose to designate it a “non-dualistic duality.” Indeed, any exclusively 
undifferentiated non-duality in which everything is reduced to a sheer 
sameness is branded in Buddhism a “false sameness”—precisely because 
particularity is annihilated.
Tillich: That, too, is my interest: the place and importance of particularity. 
De Martino: Zen is exceedingly careful about this danger of a “false sameness” 
—or an “abstract oneness.” To see the flower “im-mediately,” one must be 
oneself “im-mediate ” Then the flower will really be the flower; and in 
“seeing” the flower, one will see not alone the flower: one will see therein 
one’s Self. Hence, there cannot be a genuine “universality” or “non-differen- 
tiation” without “particularity” and “differentiation.” Expressed otherwise, 
formlessness in Zen is never a vacuous formlessness: it is always a “formless- 
form,” an“undifferentiated-differentiation,”or a “nonparticular-particular.” 
Tillich: What bearing does this have upon the distinction of particulars? 
Does that derive from rwyJ?
De Martino for Hisamatsu: No. It is solely when grounded in the Formless Self 
that distinctions such as you are you and I am I describe true individuality. 
Tillich: That is an intriguing phrase. What is “true individuality”? What 
does that combination of words mean?
Hisamatsu (in Japanese): Ordinary individuals are unfulfilled, isolated, or 
disintegrated, and cannot be regarded as “authentic individuals.” Authentic 
individuality as understood in Zen Buddhism may be explained in terms of 
the Hua-yen concept of “jiji-mug? the non-obstruction be­
tween particular and particular) or the T’ien t’ai concept of iCkoko-enjo” 
(4Eeach individual fulfilled). A particular or individual of this order 
would be “genuinely” individual.
De Martino for Hisamatsu: Individuality that is dualistically differentiated is 
not “autonomously in-dividual.” Not only is it dependent on that in contrast
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Jiji nmge
to which it is distinguished; but in so far as it is a 
“distinct” entity—or “one”—it is amenable to further 
division. To explicate “true individuality,” Dr. Hi­
samatsu resorts to two Buddhist tenets: the first, 
may be interpreted as “no obstruction 
between particular and particular.”
Tillich: “No obstruction.”
De Martino: Yes. Incidentally, that is what is written 
in Dr. Hisamatsu’s own calligraphy on the little strip 
of ode paper hanging there on the wall: “jiji-imtge” 
“between any thing and any other thing no ‘oppo­
sition’—that is, no ‘opposing position.’ ” In this 
dimension of what could perhaps be specified as Zen’s
‘coincidence of X x ites,’ accordingly, I am I, thou
art thou, and the flower is the flower: yet, I am thou 
and I am the flower.
Tillich: Why the statement “I am thou,” or “I am the 
flower”? Why these paradoxical pronouncements, 
which cannot be realized simply and directly?
De Martino: Zen avows that they can be realized di­
rectly—in fact, only “directly.” Indeed, it is just this 
realization that is articulated by “jiji-mage” “between 
one and another no hindrance.”
Tillich: Is it that there is no centered self, no self­
related self, which would be a hindrance?
De Martino: The barrier is created by the reflectively 
self-conscious ego—or “I,” which discriminates itself 
dualistically from ‘not itself—or “not-I ” “Afwge,” 
the overcoming of this barrier, hindrance, or duality, 
is sometimes translated as “interpenetration.” It is 
not, however, either what may be termed an “ob­
jective” interpenetration—as occurs when a dye is 
added to a liquid, or a “subjective” interpenet­
ration—as occurs in the optical blurring of two
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images. It is, rather, the non-impediment of subject-and-object, of sub- 
jective-and-objective, of self and other—the basis of all of which is the 
non-duality of self and not-self. Thus the necessity of the ego’s dying to
itself as
less” or “Selfless” Self—if there is to be actualized genuine “in-dividuality,” 
which would be coincidentally genuine “universality.”
Hisamattu (in Japanese): Yes. Koko-enjo affirms that every particular, because of 
being the Self-Without-Form, is itself fulfilled.
De Martino for Hisamattu: With the coming to fruition of the Self-Without- 
Self, consequently, each individual is, in the Tien-t’ai formulation, koko-enjo, 
fulfilled or “complete.”
Tillich: Each completes each other? or each is complete? 
Fujiyoibi: Every particular is completely or fully matured.
Tillich: In the other one?
DeMartino: No, not “in the other one.” Each individual is fulfilled as a “Self- 
of-No-Self”—or a “Self-of-No-Form.”
Tillich: By the removal of his individuality?
De Martino'. No; by the fulfillment of his individuality.
Tillich: What is the difference between fulfillment and removal?
De Martino: “Removal” would be a sheer, nihilistic negation, would it not? 
Tillich: That is what the word means.
De Martino: “Fulfillment,” on the other hand, signifies that the individual 
through the “incorporation” of its own negation becomes an “unlimited­
limit,” a “nonparticular-particular,” or, in that sense, a “universal.” 
Non-dualistically ‘itself and ‘not-itself—which embraces ‘any-thing’ not 
itself, it is at once ‘some-thing,’ ‘no-thing,’ and ‘every-thing.’ For with 
no ‘predicable’ that it either “is” or “is not,” either that it excludes or that 
is excluded from it, it may be said both “to be” and “not to be” ‘itself,’ 
‘not-itself,’ and every ‘other-to-itself? Formulated in the manner of The 
Tajracchedika (or “Diamond”) Sutra, “A is ‘not-A,’ therefore A is [truly or 
universally] A.” In other words, with A “encompassing” its own negation 
(‘not-A’), there isn’t any contradictory or contrary ‘not-A’ that stands 
“opposed” to it. Hence, “between” A and not-A there is no “interposition.” 
With the raising of a single finger, accordingly, the “whole universe” rises.
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Hisamatsu (in Japanese): But not a universe with form; the whole “Universe- 
Without-Form.”
DeMartino: Dr. Hisamatsu again underscores that it is the whole “Formless 
Universe.” Just as it can be held of the nonduality of self and other that the 
self “is” the other, it can also be held that there is “neither self nor other,” 
“neither self nor world.” So the Self is a Selfless—or “Formless”—Self, and 
the world or universe a “Formless” Universe.
De Martino to Hisamatsu (in Japanese): Dr. Tillich’s earlier question, in effect, 
was: “When the individual is formless, does individuality disappear?”
De Martino for Hisamatsu: Dr. Hisamatsu confirms that with the unfolding 
of the Self-Wi thou t-Form, individuality is not eliminated. He says that it is, 
in fact, individuality “in-and-of-its-Self ” that is the Self-of-No-Form. This 
is somewhat difficult to translate.
Tillich: I can see that it would be. What, however, is the experiential basis 
here? I want to understand. Concepts don’t worry me.
Hisamatsu (in Japanese): True experience is established precisely in the Self 
that is Not-of-Form.
DeMartino to Hisamatsu (in Japanese): I believe Dr. Tillich is really asking for 
a stronger disclosure of the ground of that very statement.
Hisamatsu (in Japanese): The experiencer and the experienced are one.
De Martino to Hisamatsu (in Japanese): Yes; but to complement your extended 
verbal circumscription, Dr. Tillich would seem to be requesting a more 
“concrete” manifestation.
Hisamatsu (in Japanese): What do you mean by “more concrete”?
DeMartino (in Japanese): You have been tendering “your-Self” by offering 
conceptual explanations. I think Dr. Tillich would now appreciate a “firmer” 
display of the underlying basis.
Hisamatsu (in Japanese): The Self-Without-Form is the basis.
DeMartino: The basis, he says, is the Self-of-No-Form. In spite of an endeavor 
to get him to articulate this Self non-conceptually, he won’t do it. I had 
hoped he would hit you squarely with a more direct—and, therefore, more 
“telling”—“ex-position.” That is what he should have done.
Tillicb'. He should have done what?
De Martino (thrusting his outstretched hand sharply towards Tillich): He
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should have struck forth with an unmistakably “existential” unfurling 
of the “existential basis.” (Tillich: Laughs). Instead, he continued to make 
his presentation verbally in terms of the ‘Self-that-is-No-Self.’ It is probably 
my fault. Perhaps if I could have conveyed the focus of your concern better 
in Japanese, he would have lashed out with a suitable “Zen-type” response. 
Tillich: Now to become pragmatic: as you are aware, the pragmatists always 
ask: “How does this work?” “What does it do for us?” I know what it does
for me if I say that in this flower there is ultimate reality. Individualized, 
this flower is not any other flower: it is not a man; it is not a picture; it is 
this particular flower. And in this individual flower the ultimate is manifest. 
DeMartino: In Zen it would not be put quite that way.
Tillich: I am affirming what I realize pragmatically in myself. It is my great 
love that I can make this affirmation. I can also state that this work of art
is another manifestation of the ultimate. But this work of art is not the flower, 
it is not this table, and it is not this other work of art; it is something differ­
ent. This gives rise to the problem that bothered Plato so much: How can 
diversity be spread over the entire system of Ideas? How is that conceivable? 
Where does multiformity come from? The all-embracing Idea, for Plato, 
was the “Idea of the Good.” Nevertheless, in the realm of Ideas there is 
diversification. Plato merely asserted that there is. The Greeks acceded to 
this, though they were deeply critical of it. Where, however, docs multi­
plicity remain in Zen Buddhism? I must try to learn with my dualistic mind 
how the individual—or “particular”—is simultaneously preserved and not 
preserved. I could understand if it were said to be transparent or translucent. 
DeMartino: Were “translucency” or “transparency” to mean “emptiness” 
or “formlessness,” that might be acceptable. Because to Dr. Hisamatsu—or 
to Zen—it would not be “transparent” or “translucent” for “anything-elsc,” 
for anything “other-to-it.” Just the opposite, “transparency” and “trans­
lucency” would rather denote the “nondualistically ecstatic” “absence-in- 
presence”—or “presence-absence”—of its own ‘Self-Negation-Fulfillment.’ 
Tillich: Dr. Hisamatsu seems, then, to be at a point that has nothing to do 
with sin or guilt. On this issue of the particular, there is apparently a pro­
found difference between us. What I would like to comprehend is how his 
position is even possible.
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DeMartino: That is what I sought to get him to demonstrate—that it is 
possible by his “being” it. I think there could be no better “answer” to your 
question than a forthright, irrefutable exhibiting of the “living actuality.” 
It is almost—although not exactly—the same as if someone were to ask, 
“How is Jesus as the Christ ‘possible’? ”
Hisamatsu (in Japanese): It is no other than Ujiji-mugen that accounts for the 
‘Self that is Not-of-Form’ realizing itself without destroying individuality.
DeMartino to Hisamatsu (in Japanese): Yes; but your response persists in the 
mode of an “explanation.” At this juncture, Dr. Tillich would appear to be 
ready for more than that.
DeMartino for Hisamatsu: He reasserts that it is precisely the non-impediment 
“between-thing-and-thing” effected with the attaining of the Formless Self 
that constitutes the “impermeable foundation” of individuality.
Tillicb: How does this relate to encounters among individuals? The world is 
replete with particulars. Here is one (“The Sixth Patriarch” by Chih-weng) 
that is extremely expressive for ultimate reality. Nonetheless, it does not
cease to be an individual entity.
De Martino: The particular form, Dr. 
Hisamatsu reiterates, becomes a true 
particular when rooted in the Self- 
of-No-Form—so, again, when it is 
a “formless-form” or a “non-parti- 
cular particular.”
Hisamatsu (in Japanese): Otherwise 
there would exist a “false differenti­
ation” of particulars.
DeMartino: I made mention previously 
of the Buddhist concept of a “false 
sameness.” Dr. Hisamatsu now re­
fers to the corresponding Buddhist 
characterization of any differentiated 
individuality that is not formless as 
a “false differentiation” or a “false 
individuality.” In other words, if “The Sixth Patriarch”
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something is taken exclusively as particular differentiated from every other 
particular, each supposedly standing on its own sequestered ground, that 
would be a “false differentiation.”
Tillich: I would agree with that. I would speak of the universal ground. 
Hisamatsu (in Japanese): In Zen, the ‘universal ground’ is not to be found on 
“the other side”; it has its locus on “this” side.
DeMartino: For Zen, the universal ground does not betoken anything “exter­
nal.” The particular form as a formless-form or a nonparticular-particular 
is its own “universal” ground.
Tillich: Then I must return to my question about the experiential possibility. 
DeMartino: Yes; that is crucial.
DeMartino for Hisamatsu: Dr. Hisamatsu maintains that while the ultimate
ground is not wholly accessible to human “experience,” it is not extrinsic 
to the total human potential.
Tillich: Does Zen Buddhism give reasons for the existence of this “lower” 
level of experience?
Hisamatsu (in Japanese): Ordinary “experience”—or “existence”—can have 
a double connotation: it can be that which leads to the ‘Self that is Not-of-
Form’; or it can be in itself the operation of the ‘Self that is of No-Form? 
De Martino for Hisamatsu: The “ordinary” may be viewed in two ways: one
is that it can lead—or be the approach—to the ‘Self-Without-Form’; the 
other is that it can be itself the working of the ‘Self-of-No-Form? As the 
functioning of the Self-that-is-Formless, it is, needless to say, no longer 
solely “ordinary.”
Tillich: These options are not altogether clear to me.
DeMartino: Considered from the standpoint of the religious quest, ordinary
‘experience’—or ‘existence’—can be said to lead to the Selfless-Self. 
Tillich: “Lead to”? In which sense? By meditation and so on? 
Hisamatsu (in Japanese): By “lead to” I mean that what is not yet fulfilled is
under the need to become so.
Fujiyoshi to Hisamatsu (in Japanese): Since it is not “authentic,” it “has to 
become authentic”; is that what you have in mind?
Hisamatsu (in Japanese): Yes. Habitual existence gains its genuine significance 
as the ‘materialization’ of the Formless Self. What I intend by the phrase
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“lead to” is that until common experience becomes “true” experience, it 
“wants” its final consummation.
DeMartino for Hisamatsu: Ordinary existence—or “experience”—cannot stop 
by being merely ordinary.
Tillich: Is it by inner dialectics driven beyond itself?
De Martino for Hisamatsu: It could be spoken of in that way. Dr. Hisamatsu 
speaks of it as still not being “complete.”
Tillich: And this lack is the propelling force to the Self that is of No-Form? 
Fujiyosbi: Yes.
DeMartino: The alternate possibility concerning the “ordinary” is that it 
can be regarded as the “unfolding” of the Self that is Selfless. This is what is 
meant by the general Mahayana Buddhist assertion that “samsara is Nirvana” 
or the Zen dictum that the conventional—or “everyday”—is the Tao.
Hisamatsu (in Japanese): Yes. The “customary,” preliminarily to be negated, 
is in its “Self-creation,” a positive affirmation.
DeMartino for Hisamatsu: “Wanting” the actualization of its ultimate ground 
or fulfillment, the ordinary has to overcome—or to “negate”—itself; as the 
manifold substantialization—or “production”—of its ultimate ground, on 
the other hand, it becomes a positive “affirmation.”
Tillich: So it is somewhat similar to the scheme of negative and positive 
philosophy. The negative is impelled towards the absolute; then, after 
having the absolute, we can find it in the particular—which is particularly 
negative.
De Martino: The ‘sheer particular’ in the simple or ‘unresolved’ duality of 
positive-and-negative may be said to be initially “negative”; the ‘non­
particular particular’ as a resolved or ‘nondualistic-duality’ of positive-and- 
negative may be said to be totally “positive.”
Tillich: Yes. Likewise according to negative and positive philosophy: one 
cannot stay with the tulip because it is not the whole—it is not sufficient. 
There is a momentum in the direction of something greater.
De Martino: Yet, from the other side, this tulip, at once both “itself” and 
“not-itself,” is the “whole.”
Tillich: That is the “other” side. At the outset, however, as in the case of 
Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, there is the negating of the flower, the 
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picture, or whatever, by seeing that they are not enough; then, after reach­
ing the Selfless or “Formless” Self—or the “One” in Plotinus, this One can 
be seen in everything, which formerly was only a springboard toward that 
culmination.
DeMartino for Hisamatsu: With Plotinus, as the emanation from the One moves 
further away from the One, it becomes less “positive” and more “negative.” 
Zen Self “ex-pression,” in contrast, does not have this hierarchy from posi­
tive to negative; it is uniformly “positive.”
Tillich: I was not referring to the hierarchical order. The same can apply in 
a nonhierarchical way.
De Martino for Hisamatsu: Dr. Hisamatsu holds that even so, for Plotinus the 
One in this flower is mixed with “negative matter.” In Zen, there is not 
that kind of matter.
Tillich: If the flower has in any sense to go out of itself, then for Zen, too, 
there must be something negative about it.
DeMartino for Hisamatsu: From the true standpoint, there isn’t anything 
negative.
Tillich: From which standpoint?
De Martino: The true standpoint.
Tillich: The true is the second; but there is also the first.
DeMartino: The first is “before.” (Tillich: Yes.) With the attainment, there is, 
as it were, a radical “turn-over.” (Ttllich: Yes.) In Plotinus, after this 
“reversal” and consequent emanation from the One, there is a progressively 
descending scale terminating in an utterly “formless” and “negative” 
matter or non-being. For Zen, all becomes “positive”: samara becomes 
itself Nirvana. That is, with the positive no longer in a simple, dualistic 
opposition to the negative, the particular as a “nonparticular” comes to be 
‘in-its-Self’—or as the ‘nonduality of Itself-and-Not-ItseiP—the “formless-
form” of Nirvana. This Zen way of negation—or ‘via negativa*—as the Self­
actualization of the nonduality of positive-and-negative, is thus always 
a Way of ‘Self-Negation’ that is at once a ‘Self-Fulfillment.’ Accordingly, 
Zen’s ‘Via Negativa’—or, indeed, ‘Via Positiva’—is more precisely 
characterized as a ‘Via-Negativa-Positiva,’ or a Way of ‘Self-Negation- 
Affirmation.’
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Tillich: I was not thinking so much of Plotinus as of Pseudo-Dionysius, for 
whom the Eros power prevails universally. The quintessence of the com­
parison revolved around the dual modes, not the emanistic symbol. The 
movement to the ultimate prior to seeing the ultimate everywhere does 
not necessarily have to be hierarchical—for instance, proceeding from the 
flower to the animal, and then from the animal on up.
Hisamatsu (in Japanese): The perspective from which something has yet “to 
get outside of” itself is not conclusive. With the ‘consummate’ transforma­
tion, what could not hitherto be contained in ‘itself,’ now can.
De Martino to Hisamatsu (in Japanese): Because “after” the awakening to—or 
“of”—the Formless Self, the Formless Self can be seen—or can see Itself—in 
any thing.
Hisamatsu (in Japanese): Yes; that is right.
De Martino for Hisamatsu: Dr. Hisamatsu is in accord that if envisaged as a 
process, two phases may be distinguished: the approach from the initially 
“negative” ‘insufficient and un-self-sustainable,’ which, when successful, 
culminates in the burgeoning of the “positive” ‘Self-of-No-Form’ with 
each form becoming its Self-expression—and, as a consequence, ‘Self- 
containable.’
Tillich: So the negative way—the via negativa—is necessary.
De Martino for Hisamatsu: Dr. Hisamatsu notes that although the via negativa 
in your meaning may be necessary “on the way to,” it is not the authentic 
way; the genuine way is the via positiva.
Tillich: That would be very, very near to me.
DeMartino: I think the difference is that for you the ultimate—or God—is 
finally ‘transcendent.’ The single exception is, of course, Jesus as the Christ. 
Christhood is not, however, a possibility open to anyone else. Zen, on the 
other hand, encourages everyone to become a Christ—or a Buddha. With 
this integrant “Self-Emptying” (or “Self-Negation”) that is a “Self-Full- 
Filling” (or “Self-Affirmation”), there is actualized the nonduality not alone 
of‘negative-and-positive,’ but also of‘immanent-and-transcendent.’ Hence, 
what was ordinarily merely immanent and particular—and therefore “nega­
tive,” now becomes as well ‘in-its-Self transcendent, non-particular, or 
‘universal’—and therefore “positive.”
DeMartino for Tillich (in Japanese): Dr. Tillich contends that there has to be 
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the “problematic” negative regardless of the coming to fruition of the Self­
less Self.
DrMTrhTW for Hiiamatru: Why?
Tillich: Because the representative of the ultimate .. . (De Martino: “Repre­
sentative”?) ... or “manifestation,” may be better, must be particular.
De Martino: With True Self-Awakening, the particular comes to be “in-its- 
Self” ‘non-particular,’ ‘universal,’ or ‘ultimate.’
Tillich: Nevertheless, the presence of the two stages requires that one look 
through something in order to see in it a universal. We remain inexorably 
in the first sphere and in the second.
DeMartino: To a Zen master these levels cease to be simply “two”; they 
are two and—concurrently—“not two.”
Tillich: In any event, he cannot dwell exclusively on the second plane; for 
particularity is ever experienced as particularity. His handling this pencil 
or taking his eyeglasses off is, to begin with, something particular. He can 
rise above this; but by way of the two stages, which are perennially present 
but “different,” he has again to return. That is the human condition of 
finitude.
De Martino to Hiiamatiu (in Japanese): Dr. Tillich insists that man cannot 
escape the situation of finitude. No Awakening, consequently, can totally 
transform the problematic—or “negative”—particular. I said that this was 
not the case with Zen.
Hitamatsu (in Japanese): That is correct.
De Martino (in Japanese): Dr. Tillich’s argument is that it is not possible for it 
not to be the case.
As to this point, the concepts of koko-enjo and jiji- 
recedent Hua-yen concept of
Hisamatiu (in Japanese):
muge are especially appropriate. The an
riji-mnge (universal-particular-no-obstruction) is less useful, as it may 
mislead one to differentiate between “ri” (universal) and (particular). 
DeMartino (in Japanese): That would appear to be Dr. Tillich’s understanding. 
Hiiamatsu (in Japanese): With jiji-muge there is no “ri” (“universal”); so each 
individual is really fulfilled (koko-enjo), and every particular is truly “com­
prehended within” every other.
DeMartino: To clarify the Zen position, Dr. Hisamatsu refers once more to 
jiji-muge, contrasting it with another Hua-yen phrase, riji-muge— usually 
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interpreted as “between universal and particular no impediment.” It is 
expressly because this latter formulation could give the impression of a 
universal apart from—or in dualistic distinction to—the particular, which I 
believe is your view . .. (‘Tillich: Yes.) ... that it is superseded by the 
final assertion, jiji-mugey “between particular and particular no barrier.” 
This is why I prefer to render “ri” not so much as “universal” as “non- 
particular.” “ Riji-muge” would thus be “between non-particular and parti­
cular no contraposition.” For precisely on the basis of this nonduality of any 
thing and its own negation (nji-muge) rests the nonduality of any thing 
and any “other” thing (jiji-muge). From this it ensues that every thing “is” 
—and is “in”—every thing. And just as each “is”—and is “in”—each, or 
one “is”—and is “in”—all, so all “is”—and is “in”—one. But, further, as 
all or every thing “is” and “is not,” every thing “is”—and is “in”— 
“no-thing,” as “no-thing” “is”—and is “in”—every thing. I would, more­
over, offer the thought that exactly this is the nature, meaning, or logoi 
of Love.
Tillich: May I ask, does the expression, “Tat tvam asi” come from Buddhism 
or Hinduism?
De Martino: “Tat tvam an” “That thou art,” is from Hinduism.
Tillich: Still, Buddhism has taken this over, has it not?
De Martino: Is it your feeling that the Hindu “Tat tvam an” is comparable 
to the Buddhist “jiji-muge”?
Tillich: Doesn’t “Tat tvam asi” “That is you,” similarly encompass the 
relationship to the other particular? Isn’t that intended as well in Hinduism? 
“The other one you are!” People there on the street, they are you; in the 
ultimate you are identical. If you look at a poor beggar, a powerful ruler, 
or a beautiful flower, you should realize that they arc not completely strange; 
rather, there is a point of identity. Paul Tillich is Richard DeMartino. As 
usual, the word “is” needs clarification. “Is” can indicate participation. 
In this use, however, it signifies that everyone is an expression of the 
ultimate—and that is what establishes the identity. Therefore I am the one 
and the other.
DeMartino: Zen would regard each as a ^//-expression of ultimacy. You are 
the “ultimate”—or Selfless Self; I am the “ultimate”—or Selfless Self; 
hence, I am you and I am the flower.
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Tillicb: Leaving aside Hinduism and speaking for myself, I would be shy to 
say this.
DeMartino: As of this moment, I would, too. Yet, from Dr. Hisamatsu’s side, 
that is the statement that is being made.
Tillicb: I never would suggest that I am the ultimate. “I am you” because 
I participate as you do in the ultimate.
DeMartino: 'Loh “nonduality” is not a “participation.”
De Martino to Hisamatsu (in Japanese): For Dr. Tillich, you are I and I am 
you since you and I both “participate” in the ultimate ‘Self of No-Self?
Hisamatsu (in Japanese): No; it is not “participation.”
Fujiyosbi to Hisamatsu (in Japanese): Dr. Tillich said he is too shy to declare 
that he is the ultimate.
Hisamatsu (in Japanese): Non-dualistic ultimacy does not—and should not 
—make one hesitant to proclaim that one is oneself “ultimate.” The sort 
of ultimacy that might cause such a reluctance most likely involves the 
judgement of good and evil.
De Martino for Hisamatsu: Dr. Hisamatsu thinks the reason for your shyness 
is that your ultimate is still associated with the ethical distinction between 
good and evil. In other words, for you the ultimate is undoubtedly ulti­
mately “good” as opposed to evil.
Tillicb: Yes; that is so.
DeMartino: In Zen, as every duality—including the axiological polarity of 
good-and-evil—is broken-through, there is no uneasiness to be felt in 
professing, “I am the ultimate.” For this is not to assert that I am “axiologi­
cally” ‘good’ in contrast to ‘evil? but rather that I am—“on to-existen dally” 
—both that which is judged to be ‘good’ and that which is judged to be 
‘evil? or, conversely, neither that which bears the valuation ‘good’ nor that 
which bears the valuation ‘evil? It will be recalled that in the onto-existen- 
tial nonduality—or “nondualistic-duality”—of the one and the other, as it 
may be said that the one “is” the other, it may equally be said that there 
is “neither” the one “nor” the other, “neither” the self “nor” the world. 
So the Self is a Selfless—or Formless—Self, and the world or universe a 
“Formless” universe. With Zen, consequently, it is not a matter of “parti­
cipation”—which as you intend it, if I am not mistaken, would mean 
“partly.”
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Tillich: Yes; “partly.” This is not connected solely with the issue of good 
and evil, which we have excluded from our discussion tonight, having dealt 
with it last time; it has also to do precisely with the question of the status 
of the particular and the universal. For if I assign to the particular an ontolo­
gical quality—which Dr. Hisamatsu probably does not—then while a “dia­
lectical” identification is possible, one cannot identify “simply” or “direct­
ly.”
De Martino: The pronouncement, “I am the ultimate—or the Self that is of 
No-Self,” does not enunciate an “identification” of particular “and” universal.
Hisamatsu (in Japanese): No, it is not “identity.”
DeMartino: As Dr. Hisamatsu indicated earlier, that is a misunderstanding 
that could arise from the conceptualization, riji-muge, “the non-obstruction 
of ‘universal’ and particular.” This is what prompts me to propose that 
instead of “universal,” “ri” may better be understood as “non-particular” 
or “No-thing”—that is, as the Self-Negation of the particular. For, to 
re-emphasize, it is this “nonduality of‘itself’ and ‘not itself ” (riji-muge) 
that includes as one dimension the “nonduality of‘itself and every ‘other 
to itself” (jiji-MHge)' is not, therefore, an “identification” of
“two” as “one.” It is, rather, the nonduality of two that “are” two even as 
they cease to be “two ’’because they in a sense indeed cease “to be.” It is 
incidentally in this same sense, I would submit, that True—or Great—Love 
constituency entails a “Great Death.”
Tillich: This brings me back to my experience of the particular in its infinite 
significance at particular. In your and Dr. Hisamatsu’s understanding, it has 
not this significance as particular but as expression.
De Martino: Yes; this is critical. You experience the particular in its ultimate 
significance; Dr. Hisamatsu “experiences” the particular as “ultimate,” as a 
“nonparticular-particular,” or as the “Self that is Not-Itself.” This is why the 
way of Zen, I would stress, is never one-sidedly either a via-negationis or a 
via-positionis: it is always conjointly a ivia-wgatumis-positionis>—or the Self­
actualization of the nonduality of the negative-and-the-positive.
Tillich: Here, then, there is a decided difference. When I look at this yellow 
flower, it speaks to me with a magnificent eloquence—as you know, I am a 
nature mystic.
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De Martino: Yes, you are very much a German romantic nature mystic. (All 
laugh.)
Tillich: Nevertheless, the flower cannot be, for me, more than a particular. I 
would not refer to it as the ultimate—or Formless Self. Experientially—in 
my emotions—I could not countenance that.
De Martino to Hisamatsu (in Japanese): Dr. Tillich, with his strong strain of 
German romanticism, harbors a profound love of flowers.
Tillich: These flowers are indispensable for our discussion. (Laughs).
De Martino for Hisamatsu: Dr. Hisamatsu concurs, and shares your love and 
compassion.
De Martino to Hisamatsu (in Japanese): I said that for you this flower as an 
expression of the ‘Self Without Form’ is itself ultimate. Dr. Tillich says that 
despite his closeness to the flower, he cannot “experientially” regard it in 
such a manner.
Hisamatsu (in Japanese): No; for him it cannot be so.
Tillich: It is my bondage to the particular.
DeMartino: Zen would posit the primary or “root” problem not with the 
finite form, but with the failure to break through to the “non-finite” or 
“Form-less” Self.
Tillich: Isn’t that the same, since the present focus is the relation to the 
particular?
DeMartino: Still, in the acknowledgment of your ‘servitude to the particular,’ 
I somehow hear a note of self-justification—as if it were a subtle reminder 
that whereas the concrete individual gets lost in Zen, with you it does not. 
Tillich: That I would contend.
DeMarttno: Zen would counter that solely with the Awakening of the ‘Self 
of No-SelP does the differentiated particular comprehend its own negation 
to become a fulfilled particular, thereby realizing its genuinely “autonomous 
in-dividuality.”
DeMartino for Hisamatsu: Only then, Dr. Hisamatsu adds, does the full beauty 
of the flower emerge. Prior to that, the deepest beauty of the flower is not 
really appreciated.
Tillich: If it is seen as particular?
DeMarttno: If it is not also seen as “non-particular” or “without form.” 
Tillich: Cutting it off from all other forms? For myself, I can’t do that. I see
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the flower against the background of Mr. Fujiyoshi, and he is different. 
DeMartino: Insofar as you see it simply “against the background” of Mr.
Fujiyoshi, sheerly as “different from” him, that is not seeing him or the 
flower as “form-less” even while formed, as “limit-less” even while limited, 
or as “non-finite” even while finite. This is why Dr. Hisamatsu, Zen—or, 
actually, Mahayana Buddhism—places prime emphasis on the need to be­
come oneself “Formless,” “Empty,” or “Nothing.” So, likewise, is it that 
“one-in-all,” “all-in-one,” or “all-in-all” may further be specified as “all-in- 
none”—or, indeed, “none-in-all.”
Tillich: Is it as a result of meditative concentration on the flower—on its 
yellow color, perhaps, that you lose consciousness of the surroundings? 
That I would understand.
DeMartino: No; Zen’s ‘Nothingness’ is not a matter of intense concentration 
upon “some-thing” with the consequent negative blocking-out of the con­
sciousness of everything else. Neither is it, as frequently it is misunderstood 
to be, a suspension or cessation of total consciousness. Quite the contrary, 
the Nothingness of Zen is a creatively active “positive negation” or “posi­
tive losing” that is coincidently an “affirmation,” “finding,” or “gaining.” 
It is, accordingly, a ‘negation-affirmation,’ a ‘losing-finding,’ or a ‘losing­
gaining’ both of oneself and ‘not oneself’ and, hence, of oneself and the 
‘other’—or ‘all others.’
De Martino for Hisamatsu: For this reason, Dr. Hisamatsu would describe Zen 
concentration not so much as “one concentrating on the flower” as “the 
flower concentrating on the flower.”
Tillich: What is the importance of that?
De Martino for Hisamatsu: It is then that the flower is truly the flower and 
you are truly you. That is, in the Zen view the flower is not really the 
flower nor are you really you until the duality between you and the flower 
has been overcome—or, consequently, until you become the flower “con­
centrating upon the flower.” I remember you remarking once in New York, 
“I can never experience the tree as the tree experiences itself.”
Tillich: I say that often.
De Martino: I believe my comment on that occasion was that this could be 
said to be the aim of Zen. For the flower’s own “experience of’—or “con­
centration on”—itself is realized precisely when one ‘becomes the flower 
concentrating upon the flower.’
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Tillich: I would speak of participating in its inner essentiality.
De Martino: With ‘the flower concentrating on itself,’ one is not restricted to 
“participation.” In fact, since authentic ‘Zen-concentration’ isn’t either 
a temporal, spatial, psychological, or otherwise ‘negative’ “loss” of con­
sciousness, but is a ‘positive’ onto-existential “losing-gaining” (or “nega­
tion-fulfillment”) of oneself, not oneself, the other, as well as of time-and- 
space, it is not even subject to the limitation of being “an experience.” 
It is rather to be characterized as the opening up of a completely new 
nondualistic ground or matrix of “being” or “experience” in which one 
coterminously “is” and “is not”—whether oneself, not oneself, the other, 
or “in time-and-space.” As the ‘flower concentrating upon the flower,’ 
therefore, one is the flower (“that is not a flower”), as the flower is one’s 
(“Selfless”) Self—or the “whole ‘Formless’ or ‘Selfless’ universe.”
Tillich: Including the flowers in India or Japan?
De Martino: Yes. For in the “nondualistic-duality of the flower concentrating 
upon itself,” all distinctions are both retained (jiji—or duality) and annulled 
(muge—or nonduality). So it is, returning to another major dispute of the 
last conversation, that Hitler and his shoemaker are also included.
Fujiymhi (in Japanese): As Dr. Tillich’s viewpoint seems to be that of riji- 
muge, this may be difficult.
DeMartino: Mr. Fujiyoshi feels that given your understanding of a particular 
in contradistinction to a universal in which it participates... (Tillich: 
Yes.) . . . the idea of a particular incorporating its own negation—that is, 
being “formless,” and thereby incorporating every “other” particular 
Qiji-mugeJ may be somewhat forbidding. In any case, it may make dear why 
I said before that whereas for you the ultimate—or “God”—finally remains 
transcendent, for Zen, as there “is” no universal besides the particular 
fulfilled in and through its own Self-Negation (which is thus a Self-Negation- 
Affirmation), there isn’t any such predominantly transcendent ultimate. 
Tillich: Yes—I can see that now.
De Martino for Hiiamattu: Dr. Hisamatsu recapitulates that with Zen the 
universal does not exist as “universal” oj the particular simply as “parti­
cular”; nor is there any unification or “identity” of universal “and” parti­
cular. What may be spoken of as “universal” is the lack of any “interposition” 
between particular and particular.
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Tillicb: Formulated in this manner, that is a possibility which could be 
Aristotelian.
Fujiyoshi: This is the main doctrine of Hua-yen or Kegon Buddhism. Zen is 
based on this philosophy of Kegon.
Hisamatsu (in Japanese): No, just the reverse: Kegon philosophy has its basis 
in Zen. Zen goes beyond Kegon.
DeMartino for Hisamatsu: Dr. Hisamatsu asserts that, to the contrary, the 
Hua-yen principle of “between particular-and-particular-no-obstruction” 
arises out of Zen. For the Zen master is the ‘living source5 of that maxim. 
Tillicb: May I then ask: what happens experientially if a Zen man eats a 
lobster? What is the lobster for him in this moment? What is the inner
experience?
De Martino for Hisamatsu: Do you intend the act of eating a lobster as a ‘parti­
cular experience5?
Tillich: Yes, I have to; because some minutes later he will sleep.
Hisamatsu (in Japanese): If I am asked what Zen is, I would reply: “When I 
want to eat, I eat; when I want to sleep, I sleep.”
De Martino for Hisamatsu: In Zen there is the expression, “When one wishes 
to eat, one eats; when one wishes to sleep, one sleeps.55
Tillicb: That is what I had in mind.
De Martino: This, however, is not your “particular.55
Tillich: I don’t see the difference.
DeMartino: Although Dr. Hisamatsu’s saying, “When I want to sleep I sleep, 
when I want to eat I eat,” may sound ordinary, actually it is not.
Tillicb: Then why wouldn’t he change the sequence of these verbs in order 
to set forth the extraordinary? Were he to announce, “When I eat, I sleep; 
when I sleep, I eat,” that would be unusual.
DeMartino: He could express himself that way as well. He certainly could 
proclaim, “I eat when I sleep; I sleep when I eat.”
Tillicb: That is compatible with your position. But the sentence, “When 
I eat I eat,” is not.
DeMartino: Only if the ostensibly “ordinary” is taken as different from the 
patently “paradoxical.”
Tillicb: Yes.
De Martino: The True “Self of No-Self,” however, may articulate its Self­
consummation by utilizing either mode of expression—and to employ them 
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separately or together. In the creatively dynamic “eJrttam”—or “absence­
presence”—of its Self-Negation-Fulfillment, it can alternately aver “I am,” 
“I am not,” or “I am because I am not.”
Tillich: I would call that a consistent statement of identity.
De Martino: “I am not I, therefore I am I,” would be a consistent statement 
of identity?
Tillich: Yes; of being and non-being. This is dialectical.
DeMartino: Yet to say, “I am not,” would be “paradoxical.”
Tillich: Yes, that is paradoxical.
De Martino: And were a Zen man to declare, “I am,” you would consider 
that ordinary?
Tillich: Yes.
De Martino: As the ‘Self-fructification’ of the “nondualistic-duality” of being 
and nonbeing, the Zen master may, at his bidding, affirm “I am” or “I am 
not.”
Tillich: Yes. I, too.
De Martino: Then why is one congruent and not the other?
Tillich: Because when the ordinary is used with a special “twist,” this must 
be indicated.
DeMartino: From the standpoint of the Self that is Formless, it is not that one 
assertion carries a special “twist” that the other does not have. Both are 
verbalizing the same Self-realization. As the Selfless Self, embracing its own 
negation, can be said “to be-without-being” and “to do-without-doing,” 
it may exclaim in unqualified Self-affirmation, “I am” or “I am not,” “When 
I eat I eat,” or, “When I eat I do no eat.”
Tillich: “Twist” is probably not the best word; in any event, something to 
show that the ordinary is extraordinary. Unless this is made explicit, it 
would appear not to be different.
DeMartino: Albeit semantically—or “objectively”—Zen utterances do 
sometimes seem commonplace, with a true Zen person, the “existential”— 
or “onto-existential”—matrix that is being enunciated remains unaltered. 
For when a Zen man, who may be described as a “dead-man-living,” says, 
“I am,” this is not the customary “I am” that stands in a simple dualistic 
distinction to “I am not” and so cannot be freely interchanged with it. 
In broader terms, the samsara that “is” Nirvana is not a merely dualistic
113
THE EASTERN BUDDHIST
samsara in which affirmation and negation constitute an unreconciled con­
tradiction. It is always a nondualistic samsara such that while affirmation is 
affirmation and negation is negation, each sustains “coincidentally” its own 
negation. Accordingly, it is a samsara—or Nirvana—in which the particular, 
never “exclusively” particular, is also “non-particular.” The Zen master 
as the concrete embodiment of this nonduality (or “nondualistic-duality”) 
is thus giving an equally valid—and consonant —expression of him-Self 
whether he chooses to avow “I am,” “I am not,” “I am I,” “I am not-I,” 
or “I am thou.”
Tillich: All right. Therefore I tried and tried to hammer away on the experien­
tial.
DeMartino: Yes, you did. Dr. Hisamatsu, however, held back. He steadfastly 
refrained from formally answering—or “engaging”—you non-intellectually. 
Instead, he kept making his ‘existential presentation’ through the use of 
concepts. (^Tillich: Yes.) For some reason he did not deal with you fully 
as a Zen teacher, which I believe he should have. (Tillicb: Laughs.) When 
you originally advanced the query, he should have responded to you in 
a blockbusting non-verbal manner. He did not, and so your inquiry persisted. 
(Tillicb: Yes.) Perhaps I am to blame—in not interpreting adequately. 
Maybe if you were speaking to him directly in Japanese, he would have 
given you what I expected him to give you from the start.
Tillicb: You mean a push in the stomach?
DeMartino: Well, as you yourself are now suggesting it, that, apparently, 
would have served very nicely. (General laughter.)
Fujiyoshi (in Japanese): I don’t think that for Dr. Hisamatsu to have done 
so would have been quite appropriate.
DeMartino (in Japanese): Since Dr. Tillich was attempting to penetrate 
through the concept to the “existential basis,” the response should really 
have been something akin to a poke in the stomach. That is the sort of 
reaction I was trying to evoke from Dr. Hisamatsu, but I just couldn’t.
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